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IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805. By Peter Charles Hoffer and 
N.E.H. Hull New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1984. Pp. 
xiv, 325. $30. 
The legislature's power to impeach, although rarely exercised, pro-
vides perhaps the most powerful weapon available to any branch of 
the federal govemment. 1 The proceedings initiated against President 
Nixon in 1974 fQcused the attention of many legal scholars on the 
origins and functions ofimpeachment.2 A few cases were well-known, 
most notably the nineteenth-century impeachments of President An-
drew Johnson and Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase. But the ori-
gins of the device, and the circumstances surrounding its importation 
from England to America, were not as clear. Most scholars assumed 
that the Framers derived the idea of impeachment directly from Eng-
lish law.3 However, as Peter Charles Hoffer and N.E.H. Hull4 con-
vincingly demonstrate in Impeachment in America, 1635-1805, the 
Constitution's formula for iiµpeachment was not merely an adoption 
of English practice. Rather, American impeachment has a distinctly 
American flavor, developed from the early experience of the colonies 
examining the issue. Still, his reflections on these questions lend valuable perspective on the 
narrower analysis which occupies the bulk of the work. 
1. The main constitutional provision for impeachment reads: 
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed 
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors. 
U.S. CoNST., art. II, § 4. 
2. See, e.g .• c. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT (1974); J. LABOVITZ, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 
(1978). . 
3. For a thorough modern analysis of the Constitution's impeachment formula, see R. BER-
GER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CoNSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973). Berger attempts to determine 
the intent of the Framers in article II, section 4, largely by reference to English impeachment 
law. 
4. Peter Charles Hoffer is an associate professor of history at the University of Georgia. 
N.E.H. Hull formerly served on the faculty at the University of Georgia and Vanderbilt Univer-
sity, and is currently attending law school. 
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and modified by experimentation in state constitutional law prior to 
the Constitutional Convention in 1787. 
Despite their thesis, the authors begin their tale in England. Im-
peachment originated in the fourteenth century in the House of Com-
mons, with trial in the House of Lords. The Commons could impeach 
for a variety of offenses, r~nging from treason to trespass. Contrary to 
the American model, anyone could be impeached, even private citi-
zens. Also contrary to the American scheme, a variety of penalties 
could be imposed, including (in rare cases) capital punishment. 
Although in theory anyone could be impeached by the Commons for 
any reason, in practice impeachment was reserved for offenses per-
ceived to endanger the government, or the public's trust in 
government. 
Hoffer and Hull report that impeachment in America "began al-
most inadvertently . . . as a practical, local response to apparent mis-
conduct in a high place" (p. 15). The first case involved Virginia's 
colonial governor, John Harvey, who after a clash with political adver-
saries was accused of various fiscal abuses of public power. Several 
articles describing Harvey's misconduct were prepared, and the gover-
nor was sent to England to be tried. But as subjects of the Crown, the 
colonists had no power to remove Harvey from office; the governor 
thus retained his office without undergoing the ordeal of trial before 
the Lords. 
This initial failure did not effectively deter the colonists. Several 
legislative attempts to remove government officials in Maryland re-
sulted in trial before that colony's upper house. Similar cases arose 
before the end of the seventeenth century in Pennsylvania, the Caroli-
nas, and again in Virginia. The authors contend that these cases, 
although a deviation from the established English precedent that only 
the House of Commons could impeach, do not represent a conscious 
attempt by colonial legislators to expand their power base. Rather, the 
colonists grasped impeachment as an expedient method of controlling 
official misconduct. Hoffer and Hull insist that colonial managers 
"did not know that only the Commons could impeach" (p. 27). 
This conclusion is speculative, given the sparse documentation at-
tending most early efforts at impeachment in America. More impor-
tant to the authors' argument, however, are the eighteenth-century 
cases. Tighter controls exerted by the Crown over colonial lawmaking 
authority deterred American impeachments somewhat during the first 
half of that century. A few cases were brought, but all resulted in 
failure or appeal to English authority. The authors succeed in draw-
ing a few conclusions about the development of American impeach-
ment doctrine from these aborted cases, but their efforts appear 
strained - England's asserted legal supremacy over the colonies dur-
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ing this period effectively stifled the development of an independent 
American approach to impeachment. 
As the Revolution approached, however, the colonists became 
more willing to flout English authority. Legislatures in several colo-
nies openly clashed with royal governors. A typical and significant 
example took place in Massachusetts, where the lower house of the 
legislature impeached Peter Oliver, the recently appointed chief justice 
of the colony's General Court. The crux of the struggle was not offi-
cial wrongdoing but rather a conflict between the legislature and the 
royal governor over control of the judiciary. Both the house and the 
governor claimed to be the only lawful source of the justice's salary. 
When Oliver accepted the Crown's money, the legislature impeached. 
At first glance, Oliver's case, involving an overtly political struggle 
for control, seems far removed from the seventeenth-century impeach-
ments for official misconduct. For Hoffer and Hull, however, the rev-
olutionary impeachments reveal an important trend in the use of 
impeachment in America. As support for revolution increased, the 
authors argue, the colonists turned to impeachment because they rec-
ognized it as an important weapon in the struggle for independence 
from the Crown's control. Rather than adopting English impeach-
ment practice, the colonists adapted it to their own ends. 
The authors unfold their argument chronologically, in a conscious 
attempt to chart the increasing divergence of American and English 
impeachment doctrine. Their approach succeeds, particularly when 
they describe the tumultuous period of state constitutional develop-
ment from 1776 to 1787. During that period, the states experimented 
with several different formulas for impeachment. Many delegates to 
the Constitutional Convention played an important role in the devel-
opment of the fledgling states' impeachment doctrines. As Hoffer and 
Hull point out, several of the Framers themselves experienced close 
brushes with impeachment at the state level during this period. The 
authors posit that these experiences, not English precedent, planted 
the seeds of the federal Constitution's approach to impeachment. 
Although the Framers recognized the importance of impeachment as a 
method of controlling official misbehavior, they were also aware of its 
central danger: its use as a partisan political tool to impose the will of 
the majority. The authors thus demonstrate the Framers' intent to 
make impeachment an extraordinary device, difficult for the majority 
to employ to further purely political ends. 
The final section of Impeachment in America recounts the most 
famous federal impeachment case of the period: the impeachment and 
acquittal of Federalist Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase. 
Although this story has been told before, 5 Hoffer and Hull place the 
5. See, e.g., J. ELSMERE, JUSTICE SAMUEL CHAsE 159-325 (1980). 
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incident in the chronological context of the development of impeach-
ment's role in the federal system. At the same time, they portray the 
:flavorful interplay of personalities involved in the impeachment and 
the trial itself. The authors employ this storytelling style throughout 
the book with grea,t success. 
Impeachment in America is one of those unusual books of scholar-
ship that succeeds on two levels; it makes an important contribution to 
the literature while at the same time entertaining its readers. Woven 
around the novel yet convincing thesis that American impeachment is 
an American cre~tion are stories of political scandal, legal combat, 
and judicial inebriation. In part this style may stem from the fact that 
the authors are historians, not lawyers; at times they seem less inter-
ested in the legal significance of their thesis than in the personalities 
they describe. Neverth~less, their work also contributes significantly 
to an understanding of the role impeachment should play in American 
government. 
